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Full text of "Poland Russia and Great Britain 1941-1945"

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2oth of February, by which time the entire Army had been taken to
Turkestan in the territories of Central Asia. Headquarters were established
in Jangi-Jul, thirty miles from Tashkent and the troops were dispersed east-
ward and southwards from this town to Afghan and the Chinese frontier.*
Here, in a wanner climate, and with their needs supplied by the British
through Persia, life began to be a little easier. But so impoverished
was their condition that epidemics of typhus and malaria broke out.
From 14^000 men in one camp, 6,800 suffered from malaria. In the
Kermine camp 3,000 died, in the Guzar 4,000. Death took a high roll
call from those exhausted people. From time to time the Soviet Govern-
ment continued to propose that a Polish Division should be sent to the
Russian front. General Anders, on behalf of the Polish Government,
always returned the same answer—"without armaments he could do
nothing." If these were issued, then his Army would be ready by June,
19425 to fight on the Russian Front. Since the Kremlin could not make up
its mind toc give arms to the former foe/ the only solution was to send this
Polish Army (which was proving such a curse to the N.K.V.D.) away from
Russia. On March 18, Stalin informed General Anders in the Kremlin, that
from April 1st, he would be obliged to cut the food supplies for his Army
and that only sufficient rations for 44,000 men could be issued, thus necessi-
tating the reduction of the Polish Army contingent to that number. "Russia
was short of food and units not engaged in actual fighting had to be reduced
in number. Even certain Russian divisions had been dissolved, and the
men sent back home." When Anders insisted that food should be given
for all his people—73,000 at that time, Stalin refused. He declared that
the Soviet Government was not at fault, stating that the U.S. " had given a
guarantee to the effect that one million tons of corn would be sent to
Russia and they had only sent one-tenth of this amount."f Any Poles
* 5th Infantry Division (General Boruta Spiechowicz) went to Dshalal Abad,
near the Chinese frontier; 6th Infantry Division (General Tokarzewski) to
Shachrizal, near the Afghan frontier; 7th Infantry Division (General Szyszko-
Bohusz)—Kermine on the railway Tashkent-As chabad; 8th Infentry Division
(General Rakowski)—Tshok-Pak, on Arys-Frunze railway; 9th Infantry Division
(Colonel Boleslawicz) to Margelan, between Fergana and Dzalal Abad; 10th
Infantry Division (Colonel Schmidt) to Lugovoje, between Tashkient and Alma
Ata. In addition, some units went as far as Guzar, near the Afghan frontier.
t The Times > on February 28th, 1944, in its cable from America, had reported :
"Mr. Leo T. Crowley, Foreign Economic Administrator, made the following
statement in Washington yesterday;—
" Shipments of munitions and other war supplies under lend-lease from the
United States to the Soviet Union in 1943 were almost double 1942 shipments.
A total of 8,400,000 tons (United States ton of 2,000 lb,) of supplies with a value
of $4,243,804,000 was exported to the Soviet Union from the beginning of the
Soviet aid programme in October, 1941, to January 1st, 1944.
" Shipments in 1943 totalled 5,400,000 tons, compared with 2,800,000 tons in
1942. In 1942,12 out of every hundred ships taking supplies from the United
States to the Soviet Union were sunk by enemy submarines, surface raiders, or
Statistics show how much of those 2,800,000 tons of shipments in 1942 consisted
of com.